Critical Analysis of Impact of Financial Crisis on the Global OTC Derivatives Market Regulation by Marek, Pavel
BRNO UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
VYSOKÉ UČENÍ TECHNICKÉ V BRNĚ
FACULTY OF BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT
FAKULTA PODNIKATELSKÁ
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS
ÚSTAV EKONOMIKY
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
ON THE GLOBAL OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
REGULATION
KRITICKÁ ANALÝZA DOPADU FINANČNÍ KRIZE NA REGULACI OTC DERIVÁTŮ
MASTER'S THESIS
DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE
AUTHOR
AUTOR PRÁCE
Bc. Pavel Marek
SUPERVISOR
VEDOUCÍ PRÁCE
doc. Ing. et Ing. Stanislav Škapa, Ph.D.
BRNO 2016
 
 
  
Vysoké učení technické v Brně Akademický rok: 2015/2016
Fakulta podnikatelská Ústav ekonomiky
ZADÁNÍ DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE
Marek Pavel, Bc.
European Business and Finance (6208T150) 
Ředitel ústavu Vám v souladu se zákonem č.111/1998 o vysokých školách, Studijním a
zkušebním řádem VUT v Brně a Směrnicí děkana pro realizaci bakalářských a magisterských
studijních programů zadává diplomovou práci s názvem:
Kritická analýza dopadu finanční krize na regulaci OTC derivátů
v anglickém jazyce:
Critical Analysis of Impact of Financial Crisis on the Global OTC Derivatives Market
Regulation
Pokyny pro vypracování:
Úvod
Cíle práce, metody a postupy zpracování
Teoretická východiska práce
Analýza současného stavu
Vlastní návrhy řešení
Závěr 
Seznam použité literatury
Přílohy
Podle § 60 zákona č. 121/2000 Sb. (autorský zákon) v platném znění, je tato práce "Školním dílem". Využití této
práce se řídí právním režimem autorského zákona. Citace povoluje Fakulta podnikatelská Vysokého učení
technického v Brně.
Seznam odborné literatury:
ARNETT, G. W. Global Securities Markets. New Jersey, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2011. ISBN 978-1-118-02771-4
BALDWIN, R. E. - WYPLOSZ, C. The Economics of European Integration. 4. issue, 580 p.
ISBN 9780077131722.
BRUMMER, C. Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century. :
Cambridge University Press, 2011. 306 s. ISBN 978-1-107-00484-9.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report - Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2011. 633 s. ISBN 978-0-16-087983-8.
HULL, J. C. Options, futures, and other derivatives. 8 th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson
Prentice Hall. 2012. 847 s. ISBN 978-0-273-75907-2
Vedoucí diplomové práce: doc. Ing. et Ing. Stanislav Škapa, Ph.D.
Termín odevzdání diplomové práce je stanoven časovým plánem akademického roku 2015/2016.
L.S.
_______________________________ _______________________________
doc. Ing. Tomáš Meluzín, Ph.D. doc. Ing. et Ing. Stanislav Škapa, Ph.D.
Ředitel ústavu Děkan fakulty
V Brně, dne 29.2.2016
 
 
Abstrakt: 
Diplomová práce se zabývá regulací trhů OTC derivátů, které hrály zásadní roli ve vzniku 
a šíření světové finanční krize. Cílem této regulace bylo zmírnit následky krize a 
preventivně bránit opakování podobnýćh událostí v budoucnosti. Hlavní důraz je kladen 
na regulaci EMIR a Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform v Evropě a USA. 
Abstract: 
The paper focuses on the regulation emerged on the OTC derivatives market which played 
a crucial role with the outbreak and progress of the global financial crisis. This regulation 
set the objective to calm the crisis and prevent the similar consequences happen again to 
the future. The greatest emphasis is being put on EMIR and Dodd-Frank acts in Europe 
and USA. 
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“Regulation of derivative transactions that are privately negotiated by professionals is 
unnecessary.” 
Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman on the Federal Reserve, 1998 
“I believe that derivatives played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis (…) I think 
we need to look into and regulate the entire market.” 
Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2009 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis emerged like a storm out of nowhere in the autumn of 2008. It cost 
millions of people their savings, jobs and homes. Its consequences have been horrifying 
and the world economies will may never be the same. The crisis itself revealed very 
clearly the close ties which are currently shared between the financial world and the state 
of affairs in lives of broad public in particular countries. The role of financial world has 
never been more significant in human history. 
Financial markets were hit by unfortunate coincidence of events where OTC derivative 
markets played a front role. Investors were doped by new possibilities of these relatively 
new instruments offered by recent deregulations and tried to wring the maximum out of 
them. Especially synthetic securitized credit derivatives backed by bad-quality loans 
contributed to the problems that were about to come. OTC derivatives were not the cause 
of the crisis but acted as carrier of unhealthy measures accumulated in the economy. 
American and European regulators had to take appropriate measures first to calm the 
immediate consequences by bailouts and troubled asset programs. Then they had to re-
establish the system of regulation, institutions and rules on the market to prevent potential 
crises to recur. The main long-term regulations were taken on both continents. 
The first part of the paper will present the most important OTC derivative products and 
their way of working. The author will introduce traditional forwards, swaps that account 
for the predominant part of OTC market and credit derivatives – the most risky 
instruments which were the main engine of the spread of contagion in crisis. Second 
chapter will give insight into historical background which laid the groundwork for the 
16 
 
course of events leading to the crisis. Third section will present the 
institutional/organizational order in world economy before the events in 2008. Fourth part 
will connect to it by contrasting the main changes that occurred on the regulation field to 
stabilize OTC markets on European and US market. The core importance will be attached 
to European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform (DFA) in the financial centres of the world. Last section is dedicated to expected 
changes in regulation on OTC markets imposed by EMIR, DFA and anticipated 
supplementary regulation of MiFID II and Basel III. 
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2. GOALS OF THE PAPER AND METHODOLOGY 
The main goal of the thesis Critical Analysis of Impact of Financial Crisis on the 
Global OTC Derivatives Market Regulation is to analyse regulation steps taken in 
Europe and USA in the OTC derivative market imposed by the occurrence of global 
financial crisis and the impact of this regulation on current OTC market. 
First partial goal is to describe the role that OTC derivative market and how it 
contributed to the outbreak of global crisis. The essential emphasis will be put on credit 
derivatives. Second partial goal is to critically analyse the future state of OTC derivative 
market in the light of introduced or planned measures taken to safeguard the financial 
sector. 
The most used methods are description used to approach the course of actions before 
and after the crisis, analysis by cleaving the general information into smaller elements, 
synthesis acting as a bridge between the theoretical and practical part. As secondary 
methods were chosen quantitative analysis, deduction and induction. 
Regarding the sources, the author was using the available literature, website information 
of world important organizations and governments and other supporting e-sources. 
The entire work is divided into 6 main chapters. The first gives a theoretical support by 
presenting the particular OTC derivatives that the paper will be referencing to. It will be 
followed by the motivation behind trading in OTC markets. Third part will be 
presenting the background of crisis and why OTC market became lately so popular. 
Fourth section then describes the state of affairs in the world regulation and its 
authorities on the eve of crisis. The penultimate chapter is designed to aim at meeting 
the main goal of the crisis by describing EMIR and DFA. The final word will be given 
to the expected regulations to come MiFID II and Basel III and the future implications 
of the main legislation described beforehand. 
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3. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
This section of the paper is dedicated to presentation of OTC financial derivatives due to 
the specifics of their working as well as the reasons why investors can use them and 
therefore influence the financial climate in beneficial or destructive way.  
Financial derivatives are financial instruments which are usually clinched between two 
parties or more parties and which are linked to a specific financial instrument or indicator 
or commodity, and through which specific financial risks can be traded in financial 
markets in their own right. The value of a financial derivative derives from the price of 
an underlying item, such as an asset or index.1 These instruments are also specific due to 
discrepancy between the trade date and settlement date which is in the future. However, 
it still deeply linked with the spot market.2  
The acronym OTC stands for “Over the counter” the designation that is underlying its 
informality and non-standardisation. It is directly the voluntariness, which varies based 
on conditions that both parties agree on, that should be monitored by authorities and be 
more regulated than standardised derivative transactions which are typically traded on 
stock exchanges (OTCs do not have a physical place for closing deals). This paper will 
focus solely on the OTC derivatives. 
In following lines the author will present the most widely traded OTC derivatives which 
were playing crucial role on the eve and progress of financial crisis in 2008 – credit 
derivatives. Then also forwards and swaps will be introduced due to their importance on 
OTC markets. 
3.1 Credit derivatives 
The term credit derivative is a general notion describing various swap and option 
contracts created in order to transfer the credit default risk from one party to another. 
These instruments are backed by the loans, receivables or other debt. Credit Default 
Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations and Mortgage-backed Securities are going to be 
described.  
                                                 
1 IMF Committee on Balance of Payments Statistics - Financial Derivatives. Imf.org [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fd/ 
2 Arnett, George W. Global securities markets. p. 104. Hoboken, N.J. : John Wiley & Sons, 2011. 
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3.1.1. Credit default swaps (CDS) 
As other of credit derivatives, these instruments are particular types of swaps designed 
to shift credit exposure of fixed income products between parties. The buyer usually 
hedges against the default of certain subject, while the seller is accepts the risk of 
paying determined amount when that subject gets into trouble. Seller receives the 
premium or interest rate payments. 
This instruments is usually set for a lengthy time period. From certain point of view, credit 
derivatives serve as certain kind of insurance – the buyer makes payments to the CDS’ 
seller until the maturity date stated in the contract for a protection of referential entity. If 
a credit event occurs, seller has to pay the premium as well as interest payments that 
would have been paid between that time and the security’s end date to the buyer. Mainly, 
credit event brings into question the borrower's ability to repay its debt, but there are more 
credit events that can be subjected to the contract: 
The list including the definitions can be found on the official website of ISDA3, the most 
important trade organization associating participants in the OTC market, which will be 
closely described later. 
• Bankruptcy 
The term bankruptcy is wider than insolvency proceedings and the legislation of 
respective country is taken into consideration. 
• Obligation accelerating 
This credit event covers the situation, other than a Failure to Pay, where the relevant 
obligation becomes due and payable as a result of a default by the reference entity before 
the time when such obligation would otherwise have been due and payable. 
• Obligation default 
Obligation Default covers the situation, other than a Failure to Pay, where the relevant 
obligation becomes capable of being declared due and payable as a result of a default by 
                                                 
3 ISDA Credit event definitions. Credit-deriv.com [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available 
from: http://credit-deriv.com/isdadefinitions.htm 
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the reference entity before the time when such obligation would otherwise have been 
capable of being so declared. 
• Failure to pay 
Failure to Pay is defined to be a failure of the reference entity to make, when and where 
due, any payments under one or more obligations. Grace periods for payment are taken 
into account.4 
• Repudiation/Moratorium 
Repudiation/Moratorium deals with the situation where the reference entity or a 
governmental authority disaffirms, disclaims or otherwise challenges the validity of the 
relevant obligation. A default requirement threshold is specified. 
• Restructuring 
These events include a reduction in the principal amount or interest payable under the 
obligation, a postponement of payment, a change in ranking in priority of payment or any 
other composition of payment. 
Since the credit events are not always easily recognized and clear there has to be a jury 
that decides whether credit events really occurred or not. The process of jury formation 
has been evolving swiftly in the past and currently there are 5 regional “Determinations 
Committees” each comprising 10 sell-side and five buy-side voting firms (all are typically 
big institutional investors – banks), alongside three consultative firms and central 
counterparty observer members. All determinations made are governed by the 
Determinations Committees Rules.5  
  
                                                 
4 ISDA Credit event definitions. Credit-deriv.com [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available 
from: http://credit-deriv.com/isdadefinitions.htm  
5 Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee » DC Rules. Dc.isda.org [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://dc.isda.org/dc-rules/ 
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Three determinations has to be made6: 
(a) whether a Credit Event (an event that would trigger the settlement of the CDS and 
allow the protection buyer to obtain payment for the credit protection purchased) has 
occurred 
(b) whether an auction should be held to determine the final price for CDS settlement 
(c) which obligations should be delivered or valued in the auction. 
From many point of views CDS were created to serve the financial sector as hedging or 
eventually insurance alternative. Still the CDS cannot be seen as a typical insurance and 
the explanations sound alarmingly dangerous for the general public. First, the buyer of 
CDS contract does not have necessarily any stake in the referential entity. In the real 
world this behaviour is closer to betting in favour of an event then closing an insurance 
safety. Next chapters will reveal that this characteristic of CDS was considerably 
powering the course of crisis. The other aspect is that the seller can be offering the 
position in CDS to multiple subjects and therefore be willing to pay the compensation 
several times if the credit event occurs. This could not happen in insurance sphere, since 
all insured objects can be compensated maximally once. The disquieting is that the CDS 
sellers are not assessed by anyone in regard of their ability to face eventual credit events. 
Licensed insurance and reinsurance companies are required to be backed by staggering 
capital.7  
The original purpose for buying CDS was to hedge stakes which investor had in the 
reference entity (e.g. by holding their shares or bonds), however the motivation can be 
completely opposite – the buyer can be betting against this entity and when there is 
significant number of closed CDS deals, it can indicate that many investors are in fact 
betting against many reference entities and so the system itself. 
  
                                                 
6 The ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees [online]. 1. ISDA, 2012. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDM1NA==/AGM%202012_DC%20anniversary_appendix_043012.p
df 
7 For instance in Czech Republic, the capital for licensing the insurance company starts on CZK 60 million 
and reinsurance company CZK 500 million 
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In more detail CDS can be divided as follows:8 
• Standard CDS 
• All-or-nothing CDS 
• Step-up CDS 
• Contingent CDS 
• Cancellable CDS 
• Basket CDS 
In what is referred to as a basket credit default swap there are a number of reference 
entities.9 
 
3.1.2. Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) 
CDOs are relatively new synthetic credit derivatives which were first introduced in the 
start of new millennium as innovative product. More precisely CDOs can be classified as 
one concrete type of asset-backed security (ABS), what is a securitised instrument which 
is backed by group of (usually banking) loans, bonds, mortgage or other flowing 
receivables (the streams of payments serve as collateral). These assets are transformed by 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) into a package, which contain even hundreds of assets. 
CDOs can be easily sold to another investor which can provide the bank with immediate 
liquidity. By this chain, more debt is created in the economy and new virtual money is 
created. 
CDOs usually consist of more so-called tranches10, which are backed by debts with 
similar characteristics – maturity, interest rate, risk and expected rate of repayment. 
Typically there are three tranches:  
• Senior tranche 
• Residual (mezzanine) tranche 
• Junior tranche 
The risk of particular CDO is determined by the respective tranche, which expresses the 
various rights of investors in case the underlying debts are not repaid. The buyers of junior 
                                                 
8 Rejnuš̌, Oldřich. Finanční trhy. p.540. 3rd edition. Ostrava : Key Publishing, 2011. 
9 HULL, J. C. Options, futures, and other derivatives. 8 th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
2012. p. 558 ISBN 978-0-273-75907-2 
10 French word - means “Slices” 
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tranches enter the most risky positions (but also the most profitable) – when the debtors 
default on their commitments, junior tranche is the first who is cut from interest payments 
and eventually the principal. In case when the defaults on loans are so numerous that 
junior tranche is absorbed, the turn is on residual tranche. In hard times of crisis or 
depressions even the holders of senior tranches can lose the money, but generally these 
tranches offer the lowest profit and are rated as safe investment opportunity (before 
financial crisis 2008 typically AAA). 
There are four main types of CDOs:11 
• Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLO) – banking loans are the underlying asset,  
• Structured Finance CDO (SFCDO) – various structured assets are the underlying 
assets (e.g. mortgage loans),  
• Collateralized Bond Obligations (CBO) – bonds are the underlying assets,  
• Collateralized Synthetic Obligations (CSO) – other credit derivatives are the 
underlying assets. 
For instance collateralized synthetic obligations (CSOs) can cause general harm when the 
underlying asset is also one of potentially toxic credit derivatives. When the CSO is 
backed by CDO (repackaged pool of tranches), it is known as CDO-squared. Such chain 
can continue into another iterations, creating more debt and putting into danger the buyer 
of the last CDO in the chain, who usually do not have much information what sort of 
loans are sourcing it (he has usually only credit rating). The systematic problem can arise 
when new iteration of CDO is created based on low tranches of previous CDO (junior) 
and the buyer does not know it.     
There have been main reasons why CDOs became so popular. First, it represented quick 
cash and transfer of the risk for the bank who make the loans securitised (especially when 
it knows that big proportion of these loans will not be probably never repaid). The buyers 
can see the CDOs as great new investment opportunity, which offers superior profit for 
given risk and lower costs for carrying out transaction deals in comparison to other 
obligations. It is needed to understand that the price of CDOs is significantly influenced 
                                                 
11 Bučková, Veronika. CDO a jeho souvislost se vznikem současné hospodářské krize. Finance.cz [online]. 
2009. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www.finance.cz/zpravy/finance/217511-cdo-a-
jeho-souvislost-se-vznikem-soucasne-hospodarske-krize/ 
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by the credit rating of rating agencies – when the credit rating is inappropriately good, it 
results in unfair overpricing of the CDOs and possible threat for buyers in times of 
collective defaults on the loan. Also, the banks that buys CDOs can keep the records of 
CDOs in off-balance sheet and partially bypass the capital adequacy requirements which 
ban banks from holding over-risky assets in the balance sheet (Basel II). 
3.1.3. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
Mortgage-backed securities can be categorised as another particular case of ABS, more 
precisely Structured Finance CDO (SFCDO) backed by mortgage loans. MBS works on 
the same principle as CDO – there are various tranches that have different priority in 
receiving interest payments and principal if borrowers repay and eventually these 
tranches can be furthermore pooled into repackaged MBS. 
There are two main types of MBS: 
• Commercial MBS (CMBS) 
• Residential MBS (RMBS) 
RMBS‘ cash flows come from residential debt, such as mortgages, home-equity loans 
and subprime mortgages, while CMBS is secured by mortgages on commercial properties 
for business.  
The buyers of MBS are exposed to two main types of risk – credit risk and prepayment 
risk which represents the danger that mortgage holder pays back the mortgage before its 
maturity date, which reduces the amount of interest the investor would have otherwise 
received.  
The valuation of CMBS is more complex – more details are associated with them making 
the valuation more difficult, specific case from case – therefore the right credit rating is 
necessary. 
MBSs are complex securities and require wide range of market participants – besides 
investors also primary, master and special servicers, directing certificate holders, rating 
agencies and trustees. CMBSs provides a lower degree of prepayment risk because 
commercial mortgages are most often set for a fixed term. 
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Mortgage-backed securities can falsely attract investors by the fact that they are backed 
by seemingly secure mortgage loans which are collateralized by associated real estate 
especially in times of economic boom (expected rise of real estate prices) and low interest 
rates. The buyers should be aware of the content of the MBS which banks can create from 
junk loans knowing that these loans will be resold. 
3.2 Forwards 
Forward are classified as simple and widely used instruments. The forward trades may be 
derived from the whole variety of items (in banking practise most likely from currencies 
– “FX forwards” and forwards tied to interest rates – e.g. FRAs) and are settled in the 
future after the maturity date for the price that was agreed upfront. The forward contract 
is usually settled between two parties without any intermediary what results in tougher 
enforceability of the rights when one of parties cannot fulfil its obligations and the first 
instance for resolution is the court. Forward risk increases with volatility of the instrument 
and trade time period. 
3.3 Swaps 
Swap transaction can be interpreted as financial derivative contract when two economic 
subjects mutually commit themselves to exchange agreed assets or financial flows under 
conditions that were agreed in advance.12 The difference from other typical derivatives 
can be seen in repetitive exchanges in at least two streams. These cycles are called the 
legs of the swap.  
Currently, the most spread in banking sphere are FX Swaps (Foreign exchange swaps) 
and IRS (Interest rate swaps).  
The former are two-legged contracts in which one party borrows one currency and in the 
same lends another to the second party (short leg) for a spot rate and both parties commit 
to return agreed amounts when the swap matures for forward rate. The common use of 
FX Swaps is to fund foreign exchange balances for limited given time period for hedging, 
but can be closed also for speculation on forex market. Interest rate swaps consist of more 
legs – streams of payments that are exchanged based on specified principal amounts. 
Parties typically exchange fixed payments for floating payments derived from selected 
                                                 
12 Rejnuš̌, Oldřich. Finanční trhy. p.468-469. 3rd edition. Ostrava : Key Publishing, 2011. 
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referential interest rate (e.g. LIBOR). The purpose for these swaps is diversification and 
hedging against interest rate movements.  
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4. THE GENERAL USAGE OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
OTC derivatives are relatively new type of instruments, but the current financial world 
could not do its ordinary business without them. This chapter is designed to introduce the 
reader into why OTC derivatives became so popular. Some of the motivation has been 
already mentioned in previous part of the text, hereby general summary. 
4.1 Speculation 
Speculation is the practice of engaging in risky financial transactions in an attempt to 
profit from fluctuations in the market value of tradable goods, rather than attempting to 
profit from the underlying financial attributes embodied in the instrument such as capital 
gains, interest, or dividends. It is a risky method which can take form of bear (sell and 
buy) or bull speculation (buy and sell). Speculators are willing to take on higher risks in 
hope for superior gains. These investors very often use leverage (speculation on margin) 
which leads in even greater sensitivity of profitability on market fluctuations. 
Speculation represents many benefits as well as disadvantages for the economy. Besides 
core benefits belongs enhancing of market liquidity which makes possible to buy or sell 
more quickly, making the market more effective.13 This liquidity leads also to lower 
spread between ask and bid price which results in lower transaction costs. A very 
beneficial by-product of speculation for the economy is price discovery. Also, speculators 
can benefit the society by bearing the risks that others have aversion to. For instance 
farmers that close forwards for selling their harvest can increase production more without 
concerning about future price and by that create more value for the society. Last but not 
least, in order to find mispriced investment opportunities, speculators conduct extensive 
fundamental analyses which can serve the society to identify the true qualities or potential 
issues and danger in the markets, sectors and companies. 
Speculation is often associated with economic bubbles. A bubble occurs when the price 
for an asset exceeds its intrinsic value by a significant margin14. Prices in an economic 
bubble can fluctuate erratically, and become impossible to predict from supply and 
                                                 
13 Derivatives Overview - Markets and Infrastructure [online]. 1. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2013. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/understanding_derivatives/understanding_derivatives_ch
apter_1_derivatives_overview.pdf 
14 Hollander, Barbara Gottfried. Booms, bubbles, and busts. p.216. 2011. 
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demand alone. If the bubble bursts it leaves many asset holders exposed to radical 
decrease of given goods price. If there are many of subjects loosing unexpectedly wealth, 
it is possible to talk about crisis, or worse depression. The further text will reveal the 
speculative bubble appearing on mortgage market before the financial crisis. 
4.2 Hedging 
Hedging is an investment position to offset eventual losses/profits that may be incurred 
by existing investment of a subject. In other words, hedging comes from mutual 
dependency of prices of derivative instruments and the underlying assets that are backing 
them and the purpose of hedging is to fix prices for an agreed date in the future.15 Hedging 
was also the first motivation for creating financial derivatives – farmers were commonly 
using commodity forwards and futures, banks were hedging their business by various 
currency forwards or swaps, while other financials introduced many option strategies. 
The hedging might be handled by many techniques, but derivative contracts simplify 
dramatically possibilities. 
Hedging helps the subjects to get rid of unnecessary risk, which is ceased to speculators 
or is offsetting position of other hedgers. It results in better and more effective risk 
management which enhances also the stability of sectors or economy itself. Especially 
systematically important subjects (e.g. big banks) need to hedge and be prepared for 
various scenarios of development on the markets. 
There are two main types of hedging: 
• Imperfect (partial) hedging (not all of open positions are covered, some risk is still 
kept) 
• Perfect hedging (all risk is offset, the investor does not have any exposure) 
4.3 Arbitrage 
Arbitrageurs try to make advantage of a price differential between two or more markets 
of given tradable goods. They are seeking an opportunity to benefit from it without taking 
any risk. Based on many economic models as the Efficient-market Hypothesis by Eugene 
                                                 
15 Rejnuš̌, Oldřich. Finanční trhy. p.468-469. 3rd edition. Ostrava : Key Publishing, 2011. 
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Fama16 or Arbitrage Pricing Theory by Stephen Ross17 arbitrage is the main assumption 
of efficient markets, where there are well-priced assets and all information is quickly 
processed. Highly effective markets tend to avoid economic bubbles, what benefits the 
society and fortify the markets. 
There are many types of arbitrages - financial derivatives can be used for time arbitrage. 
The investor can buy a tradable product on a spot market and financial derivative which 
not only hedges all the risk that comes with the holding of the product in given time 
period, but bears a top value. In other words, the investor uses the difference between 
spot and forward price for achieving profit without any risk. 
Be given an example. The investor buys a commodity on the spot market for CZK 5,000 
and finds a counterparty which is willing to buy a forward for this commodity for forward 
price CZK 6,000 in the period of three months. Therefore, the investor gains the certainty 
of CZK 1,000 profit in three months. 
  
                                                 
16 Fama, Eugene F. The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices. The Journal of Business. 1965. Vol. 38, no. 1. 
DOI 10.1086/294743. University of Chicago Press 
17 Ross, Stephen A. The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing. Journal of Economic Theory. 1976. 
Vol. 13, no. 3. 
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5. ORIGINS AND COURSE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
CRISIS AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Before diving into the theme it is needed to define the crisis. Professor Musílek describes 
it as a time when the majority of financial indicators deteriorate, the financial system 
lacks liquidity, financial institutions are largely insolvent, rates of return of financial 
instruments fluctuate widely, financial and non-financial assets’ values plummet and 
savings in the system significantly decrease.18 
The crisis has the roots in United States and did not happened by an accident. The crisis 
was caused by constellation of circumstances that were taking gradually place by various 
events and (de)regulations in US economy during many decades ago. This chapter is keen 
to provide background information why the crisis occurred and what was the role of OTC 
derivatives in it. 
After the WWI, United States of America took over the position of the world’s arch 
financial centre and its position has stayed more or less untouchable long decades. 
American markets have dominated throughout the world and dictated the direction in 
which the majority of western finance world was heading to. Due to increasing 
interdependence between the markets, the world of finance was significantly influenced 
by the evolution in the market of its leader and was sharing market fluctuations in relation 
to events and moods. After the Great Depression in 1933, the question of economic 
liberalism was confronted, since it recently proved as non-working properly and many 
blamed the lack of restrictions as to be the main cause of economic problems. Since then, 
the era of Keynesian economics started with amount of new regulation. First, the Glass-
Steagall Act was introduced in 1933 which basically divided banks into investment banks 
and commercial banks. From then on it was not possible to have both activities under one 
roof and universal banking disappeared in USA. Also, the Congress enacted federal 
deposit insurance19 and imposed new restrictions on activities of commercial banks and 
maintained a strict prohibition of interstate branching. This state of affairs was working 
well for many decades and America did not meet any significant economic crisis. The 
                                                 
18 Musílek, Petr. Analýza příčin a důsledků české finanční krize [online]. 1. Praha, 2004. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www.nb.vse.cz/kbp/TEXT/Grant_krize_1a.pdf 
19 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – deposit insurance up to $ 250,000 
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belief of general public in restrictions in the economy was challenged first by the end of 
Bretton-Woods monetary system in 1971 and slumpflation20 following first oil crisis in 
1973. Both events resulted in, besides others, market fluctuations of many commodities 
and agricultural output. Also, governments began to deregulate pricing and controls in 
markets introducing higher volatility. Therefore, the society was looking for a way how 
to curb it. Financial derivatives started to be listed on Chicago Board Options Exchange 
since 1973. The big advantage of this time was upcoming computerisation which enabled the 
market makers to quickly match the bid side (farmers) with ask side. Financial derivatives 
were used almost exclusively for hedging. 
The following years under G. Ford and J. Carter, the economic progress was showing that 
many of deep-seated doctrines were not completely valid (e.g. Philips curve revealed its 
imperfection, slumpflation) and restrictions were blamed for that. Inflation was consistently 
surpassing double digit figure. In 1977 Jimmy Carter introduced Community Reinvestment 
Act which was motivating the banks to lend more even to clients with insufficient credit 
worthiness, what was resulting in higher share of bad quality credits in books of banks. It was 
Ronald Reagan who, after becoming the president of USA, implemented laissez-faire 
policies, set economy free from excessive taxation and dramatically increased the 
governmental expenses.21 Important was that under him many deregulations started to take 
place. In 1982 his administration deregulated savings banks and credit companies and let 
them to conduct risky operations with deposits of their clients. In 1987 Reagan appointed 
Alan Greenspan the Chairman of Federal Reserve who was reappointed by three of his 
successors George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. During that period 
deregulations continued and big banks alongside Wall Street have become system giants with 
lately untouchable status "too big to fail". The lobbyists have been capturing the political 
system and big financial companies have been granted even greater deregulation. The 
example can be seen in allowed merger of Citicorps and Travelers into Citigroup in 1999, 
which clearly violated Glass-Steagall Act. In short, it received one year exemption and during 
the year Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as Citigroup Relief Act) was implemented 
making the merger legal. One year after another important legislation  The Commodity 
                                                 
20 Slumpflation can be defined as a process in economy when inflation rises and economic growth is 
negative 
21 It is referred to as Reaganomics 
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Futures Modernization Act came into validity, which deregulated financial derivatives, led to 
modernized conception of securitization and gave birth to Asset Backed Securities (ABS). 
In the breakthrough of century a dot-com crisis came leaving US economy vulnerable. The 
unemployment rate abruptly increased by 2%22 and FED was forced to decrease interest rates 
(appendix n. 4). In the same time the prices of houses were soaring (see the appendix n. 2) 
and the possibility of cheap loan was attracting the general public. The chart n. 1 displays the 
quantity of newly sold houses in USA between 1996-2010. Until 2001, sold houses 
practically copied the increment in population, but afterwards rocketed - even middle class 
started to speculate with real estate. 
Chart n. 1: The quantity of sold houses in USA between 1996-2010 (in thousands) 
 
Source: Houses Sold by Region [online]. 1. Census.gov, [no date]. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available 
from: http://www.census.gov/const/soldann.pdf 
In the same time banks were offering mortgages and even other types of loans (student 
loans, credit cards, automobile loans) even to clients with poor credit scoring (especially 
due to above mentioned deregulations and low interest rates). Just like that banks had in 
their balance sheets high share of potentially bad quality loans which represented a 
concern to them. Simultaneously, due to increased demand for loans, banks needed more 
funding which would be used as source for new applicants. All things considered, banks 
needed a new way how to secure their business. 
                                                 
22 United States Unemployment Rate. Tradingeconomics.com [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. 
Available from: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate 
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Banks started to experiment more with financial derivatives. OTC were more suitable 
than standardized deals because banks could customize the deals to fit them appropriately 
especially for hedging the interests coming from the loans and also for getting rid of 
redundant risks from these loans by securitisation. Big proportion of mortgages were 
packaged into ABS (see the appendix n. 1). In the same time these big lending institutions 
started to use more credit default swaps (CDS) to secure against the default of their 
debtors. The chart of overall volume of OTC derivative market is visible from the chart 
n. 2. 
Chart n. 2: The volume of worldwide OTC derivative market between years 1998 – 
2015 (in trillion USD) 
 
Source: Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics. Bank of International Settlements [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/DER.html 
The chart above presents how quickly was OTC derivative market growing. It has risen 
from USD 259 trillion in the end of 2004 to USD 673 trillion in the mid-2008. Interesting 
is that after the crisis the value of OTCs did not decline and kept steady. This is because 
not all OTC derivatives were really accelerating the crisis (more notably only CDO/MBS 
and CDS). Interest rate contracts (e.g. IRS, FRA) have been the most spread class of 
OTCs (its share was fluctuating between 70-75%23).  
In this deregulated environment banks started to securitise the loans into CDO and MBS 
to pass the risk to speculators, who were ravenous after new investment opportunity 
which was not yet spread, but profitable enough. The tricky thing was that these structured 
                                                 
23 Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics. Bank of International Settlements [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/DER.html 
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products could not be marketed without the seal of approval and credit rating of rating 
agencies – especially Standard & Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s. Financial firms, selling out 
their loans in form of CDOs, started to pay these agencies huge amounts of money to 
overrate the quality of underlying loans. It was not illegal – US rating agencies were not 
state-owned, poorly regulated and their ratings were pointed only for better orientation, 
but it was unethical and not transparent. This way rating agencies were steadily marking 
thousands of structured products by AAA or other investment-grade rating (even 
instruments that were backed by subprime loans).24 The chart n. 3 displays the market 
value of investment-grade25 and below-investment grade CDS in the world economy 
between years 2004-2015. As visible, the market value of well-rated instruments was 
soaring until second half of 2008, while below investment-grade value stagnated during 
the entire monitored period.  
Chart n. 3: The global value of investment-grade CDS, below investment-grade CDS 
and CDS with no rating between 2004-2015 
 
Source: Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics. Bank of International Settlements [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/DER.html 
 
                                                 
24 US Government lately announced that 83% of mortgage securities stamped by Moody’s between 2000-
2006 were downgraded (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report - Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial 
and Economic Crisis in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. p.26. 
ISBN 978-0-16-087983-8.) 
25 Investment grade rating is considered AAA,AA,A or BBB on the Standard & Poor’s scale 
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Since investors were blindly following the ratings, they were accepting more risk than 
they thought. The banks were also repackaging the junior and mezzanine tranches of 
already issued CDOs into CDOs-squared and were passing the risks to the buyers who 
were very often other important big companies. Rating agencies were clearly one of main 
culprits of the escalation that was to come.  
As visible from the appendix n. 1 in 2004 the share of subprime mortgages shot up to 21 
%. However the credit ratings of toxic derivatives were not changed and newly issued 
MBS of market value of billions of USD were consistently stew out (see the appendix n. 
3) and the bubble started to inflate. This can be also documented by chart n. 4, which 
represents the rising CDO market. In the end of the year 2007, CDOs accounted for more 
than USD 1 trillion. Since the interest rates started to rise again, it was exerting pressure 
on the debtors. Then the bubble on the housing market burst, prices of real estate plunged 
and houses had currently lower values than the mortgages (especially those with floating 
rate).  
Chart n. 4: The value of CDO market in USA between 1996-2015 (in USD billions) 
 
Source: Own representation based on US ABS Issuance and Outstanding [online]. 1. Sifma Statistics, 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/SF-US-Mortgage-Related-
SIFMA.xls?n=90012 
 
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1,000.0
1,200.0
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
In
 U
SD
 B
ill
io
ns
Outstanding value in CDOs
36 
 
Banks were also using CDS. On the first sight it was a good mark that they are responsibly 
backing the businesses from potential losses of various credit events. However, during 
the time banks became more and more aware of the bubble on the housing market and 
quantity of subprime loans circulating in the economy and discovered that CDS can be 
used as channel through which they can bet against the buyers of these toxic instruments. 
To put it in simple terms – banks created and sold junk ABS to other market players 
pretending it is a good-quality security and then bought CDS contracts from third parties 
to receive a compensation if the holders of ABS go bankrupt. Second, CDS were essential 
for the creation of synthetic CDOs. They ultimately amplified the losses from the collapse 
of the housing bubble by allowing multiple bets on the same securities and helped spread 
the contagion throughout the financial system. One of main guilty actors – Goldman 
Sachs.26 Between 2004-2007 they packaged and sold USD 73 billion in synthetic CDOs. 
Simultaneously they bought huge amounts of CDS from AIG. The worst is the fact that 
eventually they became scared that even AIG can default due to expected payments from 
credit events, so Goldman Sachs bought also CDS for eventual AIG bankruptcy. In the 
same time big banks took more risk knowing that in case of problems they are “TBTF” 
(too big to fail) , the moral hazard was omnipresent. 
The relative share of CDOs on the whole OTC market is visible from the chart n. 5. It is 
visible that the its importance was growing until the arrival of financial crisis in 2008, 
afterwards its market volume dropped but these contracts are still closed due to regulation 
that came with efforts of Dodd-Frank Act/EMIR and ISDA, which the paper will focus 
later on. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report - Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. p.24. ISBN 978-0-
16-087983-8. 
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Chart n. 5: The value of global OTC market (in USD trillions) and the share of CDS 
value to overall market (in %) 
 
Source: Own representation based on Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics. Bank of 
International Settlements [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/DER.html 
After the fall of housing market, it was only matter of time when the borrowers stop to 
repay their debts. In the September 2008, the crisis was started by collapse of unfortunate 
buyers of junk OTC synthetic derivatives. Investment banks were left with hundreds of 
billions credits, toxic ABS and real estate with low value due to saturated market. When 
the public identified the unfortunate incriminated companies with unhealthy assets their 
shares immediately plummeted. Lehman Brothers was not saved, while other “TBTF” 
AIG and Citigroup were bailed out or taken over as in cases of Merrill Lynch, 
Countrywide (both by Bank of America) or Bear Stearns (JP Morgan). 
After the society found out the reasons of crisis, which quickly spread all over the world, 
US government sought out the causes and culprits. In the public report National 
Commission then announced following:27 
• OTC derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis. 
                                                 
27 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report - Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. p.15-25. ISBN 978-
0-16-087983-8. 
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• Failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial 
destruction. 
• There was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. 
• Combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of transparency 
put the financial system on a collision course with crisis. 
• Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to 
the stability of the nation’s financial markets. 
• The financial crisis was avoidable. 
To put it in simple terms, the crisis was the failure of human action and inaction and 
society needs to get back to regulation of financial markets. Next chapters will describe 
which steps were taken to prevent such expensive crisis to reoccur. 
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6. REGULATION 
This chapter aims at presenting main authorities in United States and Europe that were 
supervising OTC markets and preparing legal regulatory obligations at the times of 
outbreak of crisis in 2008. The bipolarity, history, system of institutions and manners 
created gaps from both centres. In the end both centres reacted differently to the 
consequences of crisis and prepared respective recovery concepts (which will be 
discussed later). 
Given the subject of the paper, the author deem essential to define regulation and 
supervision - basic notions that are attached to the problematic. 
Dr. Pánek defines the financial regulation and supervision as follows28: Regulation over 
financial market consists of setting up and enforcement of entry rules to financial sector, 
rules of business behaviour and competences of various players. The supervision 
encompasses relentless control of compliance with rules by declared mechanisms and use 
of sanctions in case of their violation.  
In our specific environment of OTC derivative market regulation is necessary due to many 
forms of frauds and unfair practices that, as the history showed many times, are 
omnipresent despite the importance of sector for society. The main goal of the regulation 
has been supposed to be the guarantee of safe, efficient and transparent environment for 
all existing subjects without limiting the behaviour of others.  
6.1 Regulation body in European Union 
European countries have been used to integrate state and regulations into markets, while 
USA has historically tended to liberalism.29 On the other hand, European Union (until 
2009 European Economic Community - EEC) is still a young geopolitical formation. It 
has been an unit formed out of separate, historically different countries with considerable 
variances in politics, economic growth and demographics, which have passed a limited 
sovereignty to the common centre in Brussels. The shared currency is also young, but 
                                                 
28 Pánek, Dalibor. Regulace a dohled nad finančním trhem. Brno : Masarykova Univerzita, 2012, p.8 . 
29 Baldwin, Richard E and Wyplosz, Charles. The economics of European integration. p. 42. London : 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009. 
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stable. The member base is changing. These all are specifics that are needed to be taken 
into account when the regulation is discussed.  
In 2001 EEC, as economic union, was slowly reaching the integration stage of monetary 
union and was preparing for accepting 10 new members. It was necessary to think about 
new structure of regulating bodies. Until then it was European Commission and national 
regulatory authorities who were responsible of legislation and surveillance process of the 
financial markets. In 2001 new framework has been designed by French economist 
Alexandre Lamfalussy which was valid until the eve of crisis and consisted of 4 
legislative degrees.30 
• European Commission prepared formal proposal of legislation 
• Newly created advisory committees were evaluating the proposals from EC and 
suggesting changes, advisory committees encompassed: 
o European Banking Committee (EBC) 
o European Securities Committee (ESC)  
 In scope of ESC were also OTC derivative markets 
o European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee (EIOPC) 
• Committees of European Financial Supervisors evaluated standards of 
implementations 
• European Commission monitored the compliance of market participants with the 
legislation 
In the efforts of creating single market with financial investment instruments, Lamfalussy 
plan brought, besides other pieces of legislation, so-called Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID), which became the main legislative 
document regulating securities on the common market of investment services. During the 
years this framework was praised by many politicians and economists31 but eventually a 
reform was necessary and the crisis accelerated the process towards new De Larosiere 
framework and European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). 
                                                 
30 Pánek, Dalibor. Regulace a dohled nad finančním trhem. Brno : Masarykova Univerzita, 2012, p.51 . 
31 Pánek, Dalibor. Regulace a dohled nad finančním trhem. Brno : Masarykova Univerzita, 2012, p.49 . 
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6.2 Regulation body in United States 
The main and traditional legislative body in USA is SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission). SEC is governmental agency which holds primary responsibility for 
enforcing the federal securities laws, proposing securities rules, and regulating the 
securities industry, the nation's stock and options exchanges, and other activities and 
organizations, including the electronic securities markets in the United States.32 Its 
mission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate 
capital formation. 
Besides SEC, USA have also non-governmental agency FINRA (Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority) which acts as self-regulatory organization. It originated from the 
merger of enforcement arms of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). It is the largest independent regulator for all 
securities firms, brokerages and exchange markets in the country as well as for trading in 
securities including OTC derivatives. 
Another independent organization which is partly interfering into derivative market is 
CFTC (Commodity and Futures Trading Commission). However the main specialization 
of the organization is the surveillance over exchange-traded futures and options. 
6.3 Other worldwide organizations 
Even though critics as Brummer33 state that international financial rules are expressed 
through informal, non-binding accords, sometimes are viewed as either weak treaty 
substitutes, or by-products of national power, it has a sense to introduce them. The most 
important international organization in the OTC market is ISDA. 
6.3.1. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
ISDA is the most important organization associating the OTC market participants. It was 
based in 1985 with headquarters in New York. Currently, ISDA has over 850 member 
institutions from 67 countries.34 ISDA aims at three key areas: 
                                                 
32 Branches of Government. Usa.gov [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government 
33 Brummer, Chris. Soft law and the global financial system. Cambridge [U.K.] : Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
34 ISDA - International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. Www2.isda.org [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ 
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• reducing counterparty credit risk 
• increasing transparency 
• improving the industry’s operational infrastructure 
Its primary goal is to build robust, stable financial markets and a strong financial 
regulatory framework. 
ISDA became broadly sought-after thanks to its ISDA Master Agreement that has been 
generally used for bilateral OTC relations when discussions begin derivative trade. 
Master Agreement can be reinforced by Credit Support Annex (CSA) which establishes 
collateral exchange obligation from the party which is “out-of-the-money“ towards party 
in risk. Currently ISDA incorporates into its Master Agreements also amendments for 
EMIR. 
6.3.2. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Besides obligatory regulation, there have been also recommendations on banking laws 
Basel II, issued by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision which were published in 
2004 and are accepted worldwide. Basel Accords have been intended how much own 
capital banks should bear to be well protected against the financial and operational risks. 
Banks that are complying with Basel II have usually better image for stakeholders who 
suppose that the greater the risk to which a bank is exposed, the greater the amount of 
capital the bank has to safeguard its financial stability and solvency. Basel II consists of 
3 main pillars: 
• Minimum capital requirements 
• Supervisory review – supports pillar I, defines rights and obligations towards 
authorities 
• Market discipline – publicising relevant indicators of risks to the public 
Minimum capital requirements is a measure which compares the total capital of banks 
with its credit, market and operational risk. Banks should achieve the ratio surpassing 8 
%. It is calculated based on following formula: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≥ 0.08 
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Risk weighted asset concept should reflect the real risk by which given instruments 
contribute to overall risk of banks. The exact assignment of coefficients depends also on 
whether the bank adopted standardised or internal approach (which needs to be approved 
first by local regulator). For instance, treasury bonds of countries have 0 % risk weighting, 
what is the minimum. OTC credit derivatives have higher risk weighting especially for 
credit risk indicator, however they are often rating-based. Even though Basel II toughened 
the risk weightings for structured derivatives it was still not fully reflecting their real 
danger in 2004 when it was issued. ABS are usually being book-kept in off-balance sheets 
and main books register it only when it is settled. This facts led to the situations when 
banks were complying with Basel II before the crisis came, but eventually found 
themselves in the deep trouble. 
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7. REGULATORY REACTION ON THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 
This chapter will be built on the premises that were presented in previous chapters. It is 
going to critically present the steps that were taken by respective governments, regulators 
organizations and other various participants on the OTC market to mute the harmful 
consequences of crisis and make the market a secure, modern, transparent and efficient 
place for all interested parties.  
Responsible bodies were wondering how to revitalize and recover the markets by new 
order which would prevent similar crisis to recur. The predominant part of experts 
concluded that OTC markets were not a primary cause of it, but acted as a conductor 
which enabled the economic pollutants to emerge on the surface. 
The first necessary action the US government had to do was to decide who deserves the 
federal help to be bailed out and saved. It is known that many of financial institutions 
were relying on the fact that in case of profound crisis this will eventually happen and 
considered themselves “too big to fail”. Indeed, US government did not have other option 
than rescue many of them. Some of the banks were taken over others were saved through 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which was part of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act that was swiftly approved by Congress and signed by president Bush in 
the early October of 2008. TARP’s primary purpose was to buy out junk mortgage-related 
credit derivatives (MBS, CDO) which were still in possession of big banks. The Treasury 
Department was decided to carry out the operation and was promised to get USD 700 
billion from tax payers (this amount was eventually cut to USD 475 billion by Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform in 2010). In the UK, the government dedicated GBP 500 billion 
to the financial system. French government set up fund committed to refinance credit 
institutions with lending capacity up to EUR 320 billion.35 
In the same time ISDA contracts, which have been carefully constructed to be enforceable 
in legal systems of different countries, secured that credit events of CDS will be settled 
promptly and buyers of CDS will receive their compensations earlier to recover from their 
                                                 
35 Legitimacy in Financial Markets - Credit Default Swaps in Current Crisis [online]. 1. Warwick : 
University of Warwick, 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. p.21 Available from: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2649/1/WRAP_morgan_legitimacy.pdf 
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losses of MBS and CDO contracts. This was done basically by auctions and netting 
method.36 Later in 2009, ISDA started to amend to CDS contracts so-called “Big Bang 
Protocol”, which was intended to help orientate investors in course of actions when credit 
event occurs. This built in to the Master Agreement the compulsory requirement that to 
certain types of CDS parties contracts should engage in the auction process if a credit 
event occurs on the basis of a specified timetable, aimed at ensuring that from credit event 
to final settlement extends to no more than 120 days.37 
Due to the gravity of the incident, world leaders called for a summit of G20 which 
eventually took place in Pittsburgh in the fall of 2009. They agreed to a series of measures 
to increase the transparency of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and to 
reduce systemic risk. 
Europe desperately needed new regulation and surveillance framework which would 
replace the obsolete Lamfalussy model. It was Jacques de Larosière who was appointed 
to propose new arrangement of institutions and the ties between them to create more 
stable and efficient financial sector. Also, it was decided that MiFID needs to be amended 
to give regulators more power, to become a tool which will ensure the transparency of the 
market and guarantee protection for investors. New version – MiFID II was started to be 
prepared to be issued in following years alongside with Regulation on markets in 
financial instruments (MiFIR) which would back the paramount regulation tailored for 
OTC markets – European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). 
Simultaneously, United States started to prepare a huge reform with similar incentive as 
Europe. It needed to eliminate the cornerstones of crisis – irresponsible excessive risk-
taking and unethical behavior coming from greed of Wall Street wolves as well as the 
necessity to provide modernized tools to federal authorities to effectively regulate market 
of structured products. It should largely protect money of American taxpayers to not cover 
anymore moral hazard of bankers - as president Obama stated “too big to fail” needs to 
                                                 
36 Legitimacy in Financial Markets - Credit Default Swaps in Current Crisis [online]. 1. Warwick : 
University of Warwick, 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. p.22 Available from: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2649/1/WRAP_morgan_legitimacy.pdf 
37 Legitimacy in Financial Markets - Credit Default Swaps in Current Crisis [online]. 1. Warwick : 
University of Warwick, 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. p.23 Available from: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2649/1/WRAP_morgan_legitimacy.pdf 
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come to an end. Therefore Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act including Volcker rule were thoroughly prepared. 
Last but not least, members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision agreed to 
introduce amended Basel III, which would strengthen bank capital requirements by 
increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. 
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7.1 Europe 
7.1.1. De Larosière regulation and surveillance framework 
The crisis accelerated the planned adjustment of existing Lamfalussy framework. In 2009, 
European Commission President Manual Barroso assigned group of experts led by 
Jacques de Larosière to prepare concrete recommendations how to re-establish the 
financial regulation system and its organs. The main goal was to recover lost trust in 
financial system and protection of European citizens against market instability.  
Ultimately new scheme of was presented – its essence lied in creation of surveillance 
system of both systemic macro risk and micro risk.  
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is responsible for monitoring and evaluation 
of financial system stability. It creates a system of early warning to increased systemic 
risk. The board consists of European Central Bank, central banks and national regulatory 
authorities. 
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) is a system of three main 
institutions formed to supervise micro risk, it encompasses: 
• European Banking Authority (EBA) 
• European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
• European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) 
 
OTC derivatives and other securities are in the scope of ESMA which is the main 
independent EU Authority that works in the field of securities legislation and regulation 
to improve the working of financial markets in Europe, beefing up investor protection 
and cooperation between national competent authorities. This body is competent to 
directly supervising rating agencies which were criticized for lack of transparency and 
possible conflict of interests. It is active in the area of fund management and also 
responsible for regulation of trade repositories, which centrally collect and maintain the 
records of financial derivatives.38 39 A significant part of ESMA’s work in this area is in 
enhancing the implementation and supervision of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID and MiFID 2). Finally ESMA is one of main bodies bound to 
                                                 
38 Who we are. Esma.europa.eu [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/about-esma/who-we-are 
39 Trade Repositories. Esma.europa.eu [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/supervision/trade-repositories 
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European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). It enforces obligation to centrally 
clear certain classes of OTC derivative contracts through Central Counterparty Clearing 
(CCPs) and apply risk mitigation techniques for other bilaterally settled OTC trades 
especially through much more developed collateral management.  
7.1.2. European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
EMIR (EC 648/2012) is European main regulation aiming at enhance stability on 
European OTC markets and peer regulation to US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform. Its 
issuance was planned and promised on G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 2009. 
Originally, it was adopted by the European Commission on July 2012 and came into effect 
in August of the same year, however it is continuously edited and obligations of subjected 
financial companies toughen. Any company or even person acting as legal counterpart to 
a derivative contract in European Economic Area40 falls within the EMIR scope and is 
classified either as financial (FC) or non-financial counterparty (NFC+ or NFC-)41 which 
are closely defined in article 2.42  
EMIR is based on three main pillars:43 
• Risk mitigation techniques 
• Clearing obligation 
• Reporting obligation 
Risk mitigation techniques 
The crisis dramatically increased the importance of collateral management in companies 
having deals on OTC markets. Starting March 2013 all counterparties are obliged to 
document all terms of the Master agreement – most typically standardized ISDA contract. 
Also they are obliged to daily value all OTC contracts, which are not subjected to be 
                                                 
40 EU members, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
41 The categorization depends on the value of non-hedging derivatives counterparty entered into. The 
threshold is EUR 1 billion for credit and equity derivatives (riskier instruments) and EUR 3 billion for 
interest rate, foreign exchange and other derivatives. (Source: Non-financial counterparties (NFCs). 
Esma.europa.eu [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/regulation/post-trading/non-financial-counterparties-nfcs)  
42 Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories. Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/financial-markets/derivatives/index_en.htm 
43 European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). Deloitte Luxembourg [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www2.deloitte.com/lu/en/pages/emir/articles/european-
market-infrastructure-regulation-emir.html 
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cleared, using verified mark-to-market methods. The trades that are bilaterally margined 
should have been suddenly subjected to higher capital requirements. This should have led 
to decreased risk in the market. 
It is recommended to amend Credit Support Annex to Master Agreements which 
establishes collateral exchange obligation between both parties eliminating the source of 
default risk of one of sides. As a rule, the collateral is pledged in form of cash or 
governmental bonds. Parties are monitoring their net exposure on daily basis and when it 
exceeds the threshold they issue margin call requesting counterparty to pledge more 
collateral. The counterparty compares the call with own calculations and decides whether 
it fully or partially agrees, or disputes the call. This way both OTC market participants 
are protected against the bankruptcy of their counterparty. 
Also, the first phase of EMIR brought into place more detailed portfolio reconciliation. 
Portfolio reconciliation means basically process of regular exchange of list of all OTC 
derivative trades with their mark-to-market valuations, their comparison and eventual 
investigation of differences of all information deemed relevant44. Reconciliation teams 
do this primary to resolve margin call disputes, which should be always resolved within 
5 business days and all disputes over EUR 15 million outstanding more than 15 working 
days need to be reported to ESMA. However EMIR in its amendment obliges all parties 
also to process periodical reconciliation. The table n. 1 displays the frequency for various 
subjects. 
Table n. 1: The frequency of reconciliation for financial and non-financial 
counterparties under EMIR 
Subject Daily 
reconciliation 
Weekly 
reconciliation 
Quarterly reconciliation Annual Reconciliation 
FC and NFC+ Portfolio > 500 
trades 
Portfolio of 
50-499 trades 
Portfolio < 50 trades  
NFC-   Portfolio > 100 trades Portfolio of 1-100 trades 
Source: EMIR Portfolio Reconciliation Operation Guidance Note [online]. 1. ISDA, 2013. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTg2OA==/EMIR%20Portfolio%20Reconciliation%20Operational%2
0Guidelines%20pre-publication%20v%2010%2009%2013%20FINAL%20FINAL.pdf 
                                                 
44 Typically valuation, trade date, effective date, maturity date, notionals, currencies, product class, 
positions 
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The parties exchange usually portfolios at close of business immediately preceding day 
which should guarantee prompt reaction of possible turbulences on markets. The majority 
of big players on world OTC market use web tool triResolve of Swedish technology 
company triOptima for more quick and efficient reconciliation. Moreover, EMIR in 
cooperation with ISDA series of protocols which amend existing Master Agreements 
without bilateral executions in order to comply with EMIR. The most critical one is seen 
in ISDA 2013 EMIR Portfolio Reconciliation, Dispute Resolution and Disclosure 
Protocol.45 
All parties have also obligation to consider possibility of conducting compression 
exercise and engage in compression exercise when they have bilaterally more than 500 
trades. There is no ISDA publication for it because it is mainly internal process. The 
concept of portfolio compression is more developed in MiFIR. This risk mitigating 
technique outside central clearing should eliminate subjects to enter too much OTC 
positions with one particular counterparty. The process of compression is supported by 
clearing houses and market participants can use another tool from triOptima group – 
triReduce. These efforts helped recently to decrease the volume on the market what was 
visible from the chart n. 2.  
Clearing obligation 
The most important pillar is seen in the clearing. The leaders on summit G20 in Pittsburgh 
decided that all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms and cleared through central counterparties by the end 2012 
at the latest.  
Clearing is a risk reducing technique mandatory in the financial markets, whereby the two 
individual parties in a transaction on a financial instrument transfer their mutual rights 
and obligations (counterparty risk) to a third party - clearing house. Its purpose is to 
reduce the risk of one or more parties failing to fulfil its trade settlement obligations. A 
clearing house reduces the settlement risks by netting offsetting transactions between 
multiple counterparties, by requiring collateral deposits. Moreover it leads to significant 
                                                 
45 ISDA 2013 EMIR Port Rec, Dispute Res and Disclosure Protocol. ISDA - International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, Inc. [online]. 2013. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/15 
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simplification of number of mutual relations between parties. This can be demonstrated 
on the picture n. 1 below. 
Picture n. 1: OTC market bilateral margining scheme (left) and OTC market with 
Central Clearing House (right) 
 
Source: Own representation 
The upper part of scheme displays the bilateral margining – each party needs a Master 
Agreement with all its counterparties of mutual OTC derivative deals. The overall number 
of contracts on non-cleared OTC market that need to be agreed can be calculated based 
on ensuing formula: 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 = 𝑂𝑂 ∙ (𝑂𝑂 − 1)2  
For instance, if the market has 100 participants, it requires 4,950 relationships and the 
same number of bilateral Master Agreements to be agreed, what is inefficient and 
unnecessary. The bottom part of the picture represents a state of affairs where central 
clearing house acts as middleman. In that situation only 100 relationships are needed even 
for the scenario where everyone deals with all parties on the market, what represents only 
2 % respectively to the first scenario (this mathematical principle is called Pascal’s 
triangle). Moreover the market is much more transparent, what was a missing element 
before the crisis, and enable regulators to have more precise and synoptic market data. 
Obviously, it is not cheap to be involved in the clearing process. Big companies that deals 
with huge loads of value in OTCs need to meet number of requirements that are based in 
cash flow and a generally strong fiscal position to be eligible to pay for a license and 
become members. The smaller counterparties that are supposed to clear their derivative 
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trades are obliged to become indirect members of the clearing house by having a contract 
with a member that will clear the trades on its behalf. The financial flows are eventually 
levelled. The member asks for such service a fee. The scheme of described flow is visible 
from the picture n. 2. 
Picture n. 2: OTC market scheme including Central Clearing, direct and indirect 
membership 
 
Source: Own representation 
When new member is accepted by clearing house, it is required to pledge collateral in the 
amount of “initial margin” that is calculated based on its credit worthiness and expected 
volume of cleared trades. Initial margin serves as well which clearing house use as 
collateral that backs the net exposure towards all counterparties combines. When the 
member’s position in OTC trades evolves out-of-the-money and clearing house identifies 
that initial margin is not sufficient it issues a margin call that cannot be disputed and party 
has time limitation to pledge addition margin (also known as variation margin). Another 
clearing’s advantage is seen single valuation of trades by credible third party resulting in 
no disputes as it is rule in bilateral margining. 
The main assumption of stability on cleared OTC market is the capital robustness of 
CCPs. If one of stronger clearing houses falls it would have critical consequences for the 
world economy and society, therefore regulators have to be continuously aware of 
possible threat and monitor them carefully. Another potential concern is a threat of 
fragmented CCP landscape as not every CCP will necessarily clear all derivatives that are 
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deemed to be “clearable”. Finally, higher costs for OTC derivatives can result in a 
potential switch to Exchange Traded Derivatives. 
The resolution to clear all standardized OTC derivatives until 2012 was not met. Only in 
the end of 2015 ESMA published a final draft “regulatory technical standards” which 
would force all regulated parties to frontload46 interest rate swaps (IRS). All IRS should 
be frontloaded between 2016-2018 based on the category of the subject (there are 4 main 
categories). IRS frontloading is crucial since in the end of 2015 these worldwide contracts 
accounted for USD 384 trillion (76 % of entire OTC market).47  However, the big 
financial institutions have recently switched to clearing even before the regulatory 
obligation came into force. In July 2017, more than 80 % of all client-cleared IRS are 
already cleared – 93 % of them by the biggest clearing house in the Europe LCH Clearnet 
(SwapClear).48 LCH Clearnet is London based clearing house founded in 2003.  
Reporting obligation 
EMIR mandates reporting of all derivatives to Trade Repositories (TRs). TRs centrally 
collect and maintain the records of all derivative contracts. They play a central role in 
enhancing the transparency of derivative markets and reducing risks to financial stability. 
These contracts have to include all necessary information – especially Legal Entity 
Identifier (LEI), features of transactions, details of collateral positions and any 
modification or termination of deals. Trade repositories are supervised by ESMA and by 
their functioning contribute to have easier environment for regulation on micro level of 
the OTC derivative market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Frontloading expresses the process of converting an existing uncleared contract into a cleared contract. 
47 Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics. Bank of International Settlements [online]. 2016. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://stats.bis.org/statx/toc/DER.html 
48 SwapClear - The Clear Leader. LCH ClearNet [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://www.lch.com/asset-classes/swapclear 
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7.2 USA 
United States reacted more promptly with its legislation regulating financial markets after 
the crisis than European Union. It was truly necessary at least from the reason that it were 
American market participants whose behavior led to the worst crisis since the Great 
Depression, while other world markets were hit by the contagion. The first proposals of 
new regulation were suggested already in July 2009 and the final version was signed by 
Barack Obama, American president, on July 21, 2010, just after new institutional 
establishment was set in Europe and two years before European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation. It is named after two men that were considerably involved in the preparation 
– B. Frank, by then Financial Services Committee Chairman and senator C. Dodd – 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Public Law 111-
203). It is a one of the most radical regulations that came into force since Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1933 and returns USA to the deregulated market before Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
The Act is categorized into sixteen titles which are designed by Roman numerals I – XVI.  
Its main aim is officially stated right after the main heading, obviously to emphasize the 
importance of this document. It is stated that the main goal is to promote the financial 
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system, to end "too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.49 This document is profound and extensive, each of titles can be considered as 
relatively autonomous regulation. Next pages will briefly describe each title. The most 
emphasis will be put on Title VII called Wall Street Transparency and Accountability 
which is dedicated to regulation of OTC markets. 
7.2.1. Brief content of titles of Dodd-Frank Act 
Title I – Financial stability 
The main purpose of the opening title is adjustment of present regulation setup which will 
bring more stability to the market especially by establishing two new governmental 
institutions in order to find new ways in order to manage risks to the financial stability of 
USA. They are Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and Office of Financial 
                                                 
49 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 111th United States 
Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf 
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Research.50 It also enlarges the powers of Federal Reserve regarding supervision of “Bank 
Holding Companies” – the biggest banks on Wall Street. 
Title II – Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Second title presents new course of actions for liquidations of financial companies and 
institutions. It significantly accelerates the entire process. During the crisis banks have 
problem with liquidity due to defaulting counterparties on the edge of life and death. This 
new flow encompasses broadly Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which is 
appointed as a receiver to carry out the liquidation and wind-up of the company. Title II 
is aimed at protecting the financial stability of the American economy, forcing 
shareholders and creditors to bear the losses of the failed financial company.  In fact it is 
one of more titles of Dodd-Frank Act which does not permit another “too big to fail” and 
moral hazard taken by “kings of Wall Street”. 51 
Title III – Transfer of Powers 
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which proved  is dissolved and its responsibilities 
fall newly within the scope of Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and Federal Reserve.  The transfer is justified by introduction of new 
measures (e.g. FDIC engagement in liquidation). Its purpose is to ensure fair and 
appropriate supervision of depository institutions, without regard to the size or type of 
charter.52 
Title IV - Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds  
The hedge funds regulation was planned a while. It broadens requirements of registration 
and record-keeping for managers of hedge funds which had been often exempt from the 
                                                 
50 Sections 111,152 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf 
51 Dodd-Frank: Title III - Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, and the 
Board of Governors. Cornell University School [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_iII 
52 Sections 301 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf 
52 Dodd-Frank: Title III - Transfer of Powers to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Corporation, and the 
Board of Governors. Cornell University School [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_iII 
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requirements. The Title also approaches state registration requirements, sets up a standard 
for identifying so-called accredited investors53, and provides for periodic review and 
revision of the Title to take into account the evolution of inflation.  
Title V – Insurance 
The insurance sector is primarily regulated at the state level by individual state agencies. 
Title V introduced new authority Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within Department of 
the Treasury to increase to federal influence in the insurance and reinsurance through 
eventual state-based reforms. It strives also to enhance national coordination in the 
insurance sector.  
Title VI - Improvements to Regulation of Bank and Savings Association Holding 
Companies and Depository Institutions 
The title VI expand the idea behind “Bank holding companies” already introduced in Title 
1 which are broadly regulated together with saving and loan holding companies (SLHCs) 
and depository institutions. The most interesting part of sixth title is seen in introduction 
of the Volcker Rule named after former Chairman of Federal Reserve Paul Volcker. It 
restricts US banks from proprietary trading. 
Proprietary trading occurs when a bank, brokerage or other financial institution trades on 
its own account rather than on behalf of a customer. In simple terms, proprietary trading 
is where a trading desk, using the bank's own capital and balance sheet, carries out trades 
in various instruments, often for speculative purposes as financial derivatives – either 
exchange traded or OTC.54 Still possible exceptions can be negotiated.55 
Title VII - Wall Street Transparency and Accountability 
Title VII is the most important framework for the regulation of OTC markets, most 
notably swap markets. In many aspects it represents the peer the EMIR. Its main mission 
is to prevent another similar crisis to come. There are some arch point implied by the 
                                                 
53 The investor that possess the wealth of USD 1 million for 4 consecutive years (Source: Sections 413 of 
Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 111th United States 
Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf.) 
54 Proprietary Trading Definition. Financial Times Lexicon [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. 
Available from: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=proprietary-trading 
55 Prop Trading and the Volcker Rule. Mother Jones [online]. 2016. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available 
from: http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/04/prop-trading-and-volcker-rule 
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Title. These is a pressure to frontload standardized swap contracts to central clearing 
houses which have the permission. It also limits the participants of the market in area of 
trading on margin (leveraged trading) and the reporting obligation is broadened.  
It basically divides more carefully the scope of two most important institutions of US 
government for derivatives SEC and CFTC. SEC is accountable for security-based swaps, 
while the rest of swap market is regulated by CFTC.56 Credit-based swaps are swaps that 
are based on an index that is a narrow-based security index, a single security or loan the 
occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an event relating to a single 
issuer.57 Other swaps are in the scope of CFTC – their list is in anchored in the 7 U.S. 
Code § 1a (47).58  
The section 716 represents another legal prohibition of federal government bailouts of 
“swap-entities”. The designation ‘‘swaps entity’’ is eligible for any swap dealer, security-
based swap dealer, major swap participant, or major security-based swap participant.59 
Major swap participant is defined only in general – it is any person who is not a swap 
dealer, and maintains a substantial position in swaps for any of the major swap categories 
as determined by the Commission, excluding positions held for hedging or mitigating 
commercial risk and positions maintained by any employee benefit plan whose 
outstanding swaps create substantial counterparty exposure that could have serious 
adverse effects on the financial stability of the United States banking system or financial 
markets.60 
The central clearing is also seen by Dodd-Frank Act as critical for future of OTC markets.  
Central clearing is done separately for swaps and security-based swaps. All swap 
transactions has to come under Central Clearing unless they subject to exemptions listed 
                                                 
56 Section 712 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
57 Section 68 of paragraph 78c of 15 U.S. Code. Available from: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2010-title15/USCODE-2010-title15-chap2B-sec78c. 
58 Section 47 of paragraph 1a of 7 U.S. Code. Available from: 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/USCODE-2011-title7/USCODE-2011-title7-chap1-sec1a. 
59 Section 716 (2) of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
60 Section 716 (33) of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
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in the paragraph 7.61 Clearing is not obligatory for deals where one of counterparties is 
not a financial entity, is using swaps to hedge commercial risk or notifies the Commission 
how it generally meets its financial obligations associated with entering into non-cleared 
swaps. All swaps eligible for clearing has to be cleared by licensed clearing house or 
“swap execution facility”.62 
Another obligation for swap dealers and major swap participants is to be registered within 
respective authority (SEC of CFTC). All of them are obliged to extensive recording 
obligation relating to the business for a time period that is determined by the regulator 
but not less than 5 years.63. Title 7 regulates the maximal exposure of clearing 
organization to potential losses from defaults and  margin requirement. The reporting 
obligation is enlarged and swap participants have to be registered within swap data 
repositories which are subject to inspection and examination by representatives of 
Commission.64 
Title VIII - Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision  
Title VIII provides a new framework for assessing the systemic risk associated with 
financial institutions and financial market utilities involved in clearing activities for 
financial transactions.  It empowers extensively Federal Reserve, CTFC, SEC and FDIC 
in order to enhance cooperation to mitigate systemic risk by establishing standards for 
efficient clearing processes. 
Title IX - Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities 
This Title is partially completing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by establishing an 
Investor Advisory Committee (IAC), an Office of the Investor Advocate (“OIA”) and an 
ombudsman appointed by the Investor Advocate. IAC should serve as advisor of SEC 
                                                 
61 Section 723 (7) of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
62 Section 723 (8) of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
63 Section 725 (2) k) of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 
203. 111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf. 
64 Section 728 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
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especially in terms of rights of investors. SEC is obliged to conduct studies on the 
financial literacy levels of retail investors and the current rules and regulations concerning 
brokers, dealers and investment advisors.65 Last but not least, the Title empowers 
Government Accountability Office to investigate about possible conflict of interests 
within investment firms and mutual funds.66 
Title X - Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
This title follows up Title 9 by enhancing the safety of consumers of financial services. It 
establishes the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency 
within the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The main task is to keep 
the consumers informed, aware of the possible shadow risks and invisible fees. 
Comparatively it has close to MiFID in Europe. 
Title XI - Federal Reserve System Provisions 
In short, it allows greater supervision of the Federal Reserve System. This is source 
basically due to extended influence FED gained over the financial markets and economy 
of the country. Its operations started to be audited by Comptroller General of the United 
States. Besides the Federal Reserve Board, also its branches and credit facilities are in 
scope of the supervisions. Once again, the bailouts are prohibited which should be 
supervised by Comptroller. 
Title XII - Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions 
Title XII was enacted to provide millions of low-to-moderate income individuals living 
in the United States the opportunity to access and utilize appropriate mainstream financial 
products and services. It authorizes the Secretary of the United States Department of the 
Treasury to create multi-year grant programs in attempt to minimize the exposure of low-
to-moderate income individuals to “predatory lenders”. 
 
 
                                                 
65 https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_ix 
66 Section 918- 918 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
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Title XIII - Pay It Back Act 
As it was mentioned earlier in the text, this Title decreased the allocation of amount in 
TARP. Original amount USD 700 billion has been cut to USD 475 billion. Moreover, the 
Congress is banned from transfer any other funds for eventual new troubled asset 
programs after June, 2010. This has been done to reduce federal budget deficit and 
prevent from moral hazard by taking on more risk than the counterparty is able to bear 
without being exposed to excessive risks.67 
Title XIV - Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act 
Title XIV establishes minimum standards for all mortgage products, whose will not be 
that easy to obtain is it was after the dotcom bubble. Creditors may not make a home 
mortgage loan unless they reasonably determine that the borrower can repay the loan 
based on the borrower’s credit history, current income, expected income and other 
factors. All requirements are enumerated in section 1411.68 This title should result in more 
credible mortgage-backed securities even in case of junior or mezzanine tranches. 
Title XV - Miscellaneous Provisions 
This Title comprises various provisions that are not easily assignable to greater blocs but 
were necessary to be mentioned in the Act. Probably the most important section concerns 
the obligation of US Executive Director at International Monetary Fund to approve loans 
to foreign countries that are unlikely to be repaid in order to protect American taxpayers.69 
It also demonstrates the aversion the federal government had to moral hazard behavior. 
Title XVI – Contracts 
Last Title is the shortest (1 paragraph) and amends Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
regarding accounting matters. 
                                                 
67 Section 1302 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
68 Section 1411 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
69 Section 1501 of Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Publ Law 111 – 203. 
111th United States Congress, 2010. Available from: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-
cpa.pdf. 
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8. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Insufficient regulation of OTC markets caused immense damages, nevertheless OTC 
markets are also responsible for a lot of good. Particularly, in banking practice they are 
necessary for hedging of various risks and their appropriate use may be beneficiary for 
the good of system. However only under credible and firm rules.  
The regulation need to adjust the rules to the extent which is in interests of common good. 
These rules will have to more strict and their adoption even expensive for smaller parties 
which will be probably under pressure whether it is reasonable to comply with rules on 
OTC market or switch to exchange-traded deals. EMIR and Dodd-Frank Act make no 
secret in wishing to transfer the absolute maximum of OTC market trades to central 
clearing even for small parties that need a little quantity of deals for their hedging. 
However these small fish would pay so large fees to the member of the clearing house, 
that it would be sometimes irrational to do so and therefore they will not hedge, what is 
not good for the system. Even in potential scenario when these small counterparties 
remain to do bilateral margining, there is a pressure to collateralize the trades what can 
result in outflow of liquidity due to possible pledge of extensive cash to counterparty. 
One of the main causes of the crisis is definitely the lack of discipline and greed of 
bankers. The way of thinking is needed to be changed what is clearly much more 
developed in the Dodd-Frank Reform in USA. In Title 6 it introduces the Volcker Rule 
which prohibits proprietary trading what is a significant change which should decrease 
the hunger and greed of Wall Street. Secondly, Dodd-Frank gave a clear impulse that the 
federal government may nevermore bail them out then they got into trouble. The aversion 
against the thinking “too big to fail” led to both explicit and implicit prohibition of state 
bailouts from the money of taxpayers. Now, it is necessary to reckon whether these 
statements are credible in case another turbulent times come across. The author of the 
paper has real doubts about it and objects that there will be always major players on the 
market whose power will be undisputable and the system will be dependent on them. In 
case of a systemic shock, recession or micro-level trouble it may be very risky to do 
nothing and let them down. Even though the regulation brought the term “Bank Holding 
Companies”, it is unclear how differently will those parties be regulated. One of the worst 
scenario is the possible default of new giants on OTC markets – Central Clearing Houses, 
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which could make the world economy collapse. EMIR does not yet introduce any 
significant warning regarding stopping bailing out micro-level entities. Therefore, 
European banks may speculate more on the OTC market. 
It is also necessary to present two pieces of legislation that are on its way for Europe – 
MiFID II and MiFIR. 
The first edition of Market in Financial Instruments Directive implemented in 2007 was 
aimed at increasing competition and improving investor protection on forming market of 
investment services. MiFID had to be review after the crisis to bring changes resulting in 
even greater protection of financial market stability and its participants. The first 
consultations started in April 2010 and resulted in creation of new legislation - MiFID II 
and MiFIR which entered into force on 2nd July 2014. All Member States have to 
implement both changes into national laws until 3rd July 2017 what is still an ongoing 
process. 
As to the environment of OTC markets MiFIR includes an obligation to trade certain 
classes of derivatives exclusively on trading venues. ESMA meanwhile has determined 
which classes of derivatives fall under this mandate, subject to their being clearing-
eligible and sufficiently liquid. In light of this framework, it is therefore unnecessary to 
seek to define the scope of ‘OTC’ trading in legislation. The focus is put on defining 
trading venues. The more standardised and liquid part of what we currently refer to as the 
‘OTC’ derivatives market will in future no longer trade on a purely OTC basis and will 
instead move to a trading venue. There are three types of organised trading venue under 
the MiFID II framework: Regulated market, Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) and 
Organised Trading Facility (OTF). 70 
• MTF is defined as multilateral system operated by an investment firm or market 
operator, which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests 
                                                 
70 Understanding the role of the MiFID2/MiFIR ‘OTC’ category [online]. 1. ISDA, 2012. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
https://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDg4OQ==/The%20role%20of%20OTC%20under%20MiFID%20-
%20Oct%202012.pdf 
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in financial instruments in the system, in accordance with non-discretionary 
rules.71 
• OTF means a multilateral system in which multiple third party buying and selling 
interests in bonds, structured finance product, emissions allowances or derivatives 
are able to interact in the system in a way which results in a contract.72 
• Regulated market represents multilateral system operated and/or managed by a 
market operator, which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of 
multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments in the 
system, in accordance with its non-discretionary rules.73 
 
Last but not least all trading – whether OTC or on venue – will be subject to extended 
post-trade reporting.  
It is necessary to give a few remarks about prepared Basel III, which represents a 
continuation of series of Basel Accords, voluntary worldwide regulatory framework on 
bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity test.  It was developed mainly 
in 2010 only after a year of last adjustments that were added to Basel II – as e.g. new 
guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book.74 There are new 
core principles that support the existing recommendation introduced by Basel II.  
Capital requirements 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑂𝑂 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒 (𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 1)
𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟 ≥ 4.5 % 
Tier 1 consists of the core bank capital – especially common stock and retained earnings. 
Risk-weighted assets are a bank's assets or off-balance-sheet exposures that weighted 
                                                 
71 Article 4 (22) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065. 
72 Article 4 (23) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065. 
73 Article 4 (21) of Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065. 
74 Revisions to the Basel II risk framework [online]. 1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009. 
[Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs148.pdf?noframes=1 
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according to risk. OTC derivatives were clearly being imprecisely weighted in Basel II 
what Basel III tries to eliminate. 
Basel committee also introduces a new capital charge - the credit valuation adjustment 
(CVA). It aims at improving banks’ resilience against potential mark-to-market losses 
associated with deterioration in the creditworthiness of counterparties to non-cleared 
derivatives trades. Centrally cleared trades are exempt from calculations.75 
Basel III implementation was several times extended. Currently it is expected to come 
into force on 31 March 2019. 
  
                                                 
75 Basel III Framework: The Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) Charge for OTC Derivative Trades 
[online]. 1. Shearman.com, 2013. [Accessed 21  July  2016]. Available from: 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2013/11/BaselIIIFrameworkTheCred
itValuationAdjustmentCVA-ChargeforOTCDerivativeTradesFIAFR111113.pdf 
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9. CONCLUSION 
The paper was looking into the problematic of OTC derivative market that largely 
emerged in the 70’s thanks to economic shocks – oil crisis followed by slumpflation - in 
US economy which was looking for new ways how to reduce risks in the system. OTC 
trades were gaining on importance thanks to increased wealth of Wall Street and its lobby 
which ensured the deregulation for the sector. In this light, the most important was 
legislation on the edge of millennium - Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act practically annulled the 
Glass-Steagall Act which investing and commercial activities under one roof of bank. 
Also the securitization was on the rise allowing to pack various debt into CDO 
instruments. However these loans that backed the credit derivatives were significantly 
risky and when the bubble of real estate properties burst these assets became worthless. 
Many subjects knew about the risk in CDO contracts but were systematically paying to 
credit agencies to overrate the instruments. The damage was amplified by speculation 
with CDS contracts on credit events of buyers of CDOs. 
When the market recognized that the loans will not be sufficiently repaid it plummeted. 
Federal Reserve alongside worldwide authorities bailed out the major “too big to fail” 
subjects and helped the sector to get rid of toxic OTC securitised products. Meanwhile 
new regulation was on its way. 
European financial sector regulation system was deeply adjusted. De Larosiere 
framework was set up – bringing in place ESMA, which was decided to take over 
regulation over securities including OTC products and appointed as main supervisor of 
EMIR, which came into force in 2012. EMIR is the main legislation ruling OTC 
derivative markets. Its main vision is to transfer the maximum of OTC trades to Central 
Clearing mechanism which should significantly simplify the market surveillance and to 
guarantee stabilization in eventual recessions when parties default. Two other main pillars 
concerns introducing risk mitigation techniques as more profound collateralisation, 
portfolio reconciliation and assert the portfolio compression. Third important pillar is 
extended reporting. 
United States did not rebuilt its regulation system from the scratch as Europe and 
therefore could react more flexibly. It issued Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act already in 2010. It is built differently than EMIR, but there are 
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similarities. Both regulations impose the obligation for selected product classes to be 
centrally cleared, reporting obligations that will simplify the supervision and available 
influence of arch authorities. Both regimes are supported by ISDA, the biggest worldwide 
organization encompassing the market participants, which incorporates the legislation 
into Master Agreements which are designed to be law-complying worldwide. Dodd-
Frank Reform also establishes new bodies and reallocate scope of existing regulators. It 
clearly states the necessity of stop thinking in the way of “too big to fail” and directly 
prohibits usual bailouts. 
The future holds new MiFID II and MiFIR regulation in Europe, which both are supposed 
to increase the protection of consumers (similarly as Title 10 of DFA), but they are 
engineered also to engage in OTC market. The main is the idea of creation of trading 
venues, organized market places for OTC derivative deals. There is also expectation for 
new Basel III which should bring into place new capital requirements, leverage ratio, 
liquidity requirements and credit valuation adjustment risk framework.  
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